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Abstract
International shipping is on the eve of a new era where remotely controlled and partially or fully
automated and unmanned Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) will be carrying
international trade. The regulation of navigation and shipping in the contemporary international
law of the sea and international maritime law are premised on human presence and control onboard ships. Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 and
several maritime conventions will need to be revisited to determine how MASS may be
accommodated, and where not possible, what further legal development may be needed.
Recently, the IMO decided to address the expected regulatory impacts of these ships and to
prepare an agenda for their proactive regulation. This article explores regulatory impacts that
would need to be considered and argues that MASS have the potential to provide new directions
for international law and the IMO.

Keywords
International Law of the Sea, International Maritime Law, International Maritime Organization,
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I.

Introduction

In recent years, research in artificial intelligence and ship technology has advanced to such an
extent as to pave the way for partial or full autonomous commercial shipping. Technology has
always been at the centre of shipping regulation and is frequently a major driver for new
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standards. Recent technological and commercial triggers are leading major industry actors to
explore different degrees of remotely-controlled ship voyages1 and autonomous ship operations
for the near future.2 Some port operations appear to be also planning to embrace automation.3
The absence of a crew on a vessel, per se, is not a new development, as unmanned towed barges
and remotely operated submersibles for research and offshore petroleum development have long
been in use. What is new is a combination of passive presence or even absence of on-board crew,
remotely-controlled ships, and partial or full autonomous decision-making through
instrumentation. These technologies are anticipated not only for new builds, but also for vessels
retrofitted for remote control operations.4 The range of ships affected is diverse.5

1

Rolls-Royce and towage company Svitzer claim to have performed the first remotely-controlled vessel operation.
See Anon.,World’s First Remotely-Controlled Commercial Vessel Put to the Test in Copenhagen, gCaptain, 20 June
2017, available at: http://gcaptain.com/worlds-first-remotely-controlled-commercial-vessel-put-to-the-test-incopenhagen/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Gcaptain+%28gCaptain.co
m%29 (accessed on 18 September 2017). Wei Zhe Tan, NYK aims to pilot remote-controlled boxship in 2019,
Lloyd’s List, 24 August 2017, available at:

https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL111056/NYK-aims-to-pilot-remotecontrolledboxship-in-2019 (accessed on 14 December 2017). See also Michelle Howard, Wärtsilä Tests Remote Control
Ship Operating Capability, Marine Link, 18 September 2017, available at:
https://www.marinelink.com/news/capability-operating428998?utm_source=MT-ENews-2017-0901&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MT-ENews (accessed on 18 September 2017).
2
The Unmanned Cargo Ship Development Alliance plans to deliver the first unmanned cargo ship in 2021. The
Alliance is led by Chinese HNA Technology Group Co and includes CCS, China Ship Research & Development
Institute, Shanghai Marine Diesel Engine Research Institute, Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding (Group) Co., Marine
Design Research Institute of China (MARIC), Rolls-Royce, Wärtsilä, and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS),
Anon., ABS Joins Alliance Developing Unmanned Cargo Ship, gCaptain, 26 July 2017, available at:
http://gcaptain.com/abs-joins-alliance-to-develop-unmanned-cargo-ship/ (accessed on 14 December 2017). A 120
Twenty-foot Equivalent Units autonomous open top fully-electric and zero emission container ship is under
construction, see Kongsberg Maritime, Autonomous ship project, key facts about YARA Birkeland, available at:
https://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nokbg0240.nsf/AllWeb/4B8113B707A50A4FC125811D00407045?OpenD
ocument (accessed on 18 September 2017). Bourbon, Automated Ships Ltd, and Kongsberg Gruppen ASA plan to
build autonomous offshore service vessels, see Anon., Bourbon Joins Project to Build World’s First Autonomous
Offshore Vessel, gCaptain, 11 July 2017, available at: http://gcaptain.com/bourbon-joins-project-to-build-firstautonomous-offshore-vessel/ (accessed on 18 September 2017).
3
Anon., VCIT world’s first fully automated container terminal: Cargotec, Canadian Shipper, 11 September 2017,
available at: https://www.canadianshipper.com/transportation-and-logistics/vcit-worlds-first-fully-automatedcontainer-terminal-cargotec/1003374728/ (accessed on 18 September 2017).
4
Alan M. Weigel/Sean T. Pribyl, The Future Is Now: Unmanned and Autonomous Surface Vessels and Their Impact
on the Maritime Industry, Mainbrace, June 2017, 22, 23, available at:
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/Publications/Mainbrace_June_2017.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017).
5
In particular, the carriage of bulk cargoes is expected to be a prime candidate for autonomous ships, see David
Stringer, Autonomous Cargo Ships Extend Miner’s Technology Drive to Seas, gCaptain, 7 June 2017, available at:
http://gcaptain.com/autonomous-cargo-ships-extend-miners-technology-driveseas/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Gcaptain+%28gCaptain.com%29
(accessed on 18 September 2017). However, automation on containerships is also anticipated. NYK is reported to be
planning to test remote controlled steering of a boxship with a stand-by crew, Anon., NYK to Test Autonomous Box
Ship in the Pacific Oceans in 2019, World Maritime News, 25 August 2017, available at:
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The history of international maritime law is punctuated by game-changing technological
milestones. This is not surprising as the ship is a platform for varied instrumentation, with the
consequence that technological development serves to enhance ship function and operations and,
in turn, rules and standards for safety, security, and environment protection. The advent of the
modern cruise liner and early ship losses, most especially the Titanic, led to the adoption of the
first convention on safety of life at sea.6 In the mid-19th century, the first rules of the road were
introduced as a result of the introduction of the steam engine in shipping and the need to reduce
collisions at sea. Following the Second World War, the widespread introduction of radar on
commercial vessels led to numerous radar-assisted collisions which resulted in important
changes in the application of the rules of the road.7 During the same period, on-board freezer
technology enabled the transportation of refrigerated cargoes and in the process produced new
trades.8 Within a short period thereafter, the advent of the supertanker and containerisation
revolutionised the carriage of goods in bulk and packaged form. The increased use of tankers led
to far-reaching vessel-source pollution regulation in both the public and private law spheres. This
extended to construction and operational requirements9 as well as liability regimes.10 Container
vessels transformed maritime trade and multi-modal carriage of cargo.11 More recently, with the
receding of summer sea ice as a result of climate change and growth of shipping in polar regions,
new rules for the construction, equipping, crewing, and operations for vessels navigating those
waters have been adopted.12 The technology of shipping has driven much of the opus of the
http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/228202/nyk-to-test-autonomous-boxship-in-2019/ (accessed on 18
September 2017).
6
Eventually leading to the current iteration, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November
1974, UNTS 1184, 2 (SOLAS Convention).
7
In particular the rules on look out and safe speed. Arts. 5-6 Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 October 1972, UNTS 1050, 16 (COLREGS).
8
See Stanley H. Beaver, Ships and Shipping: The Geographical Consequences of Technological Progress,
Geography 52 (1967), 133.
9
Primarily under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, UNTS
1340, 184, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, UNTS 1340, 61 (MARPOL). Annex 1 includes standards and rules for
construction and discharge of oily wastes from tank washing at sea.
10
In particular the following: International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November
1969, UNTS 973, 3 (CLC Convention); International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, UNTS 1110, 57 (IOPCF Convention).
11
See Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy
Bigger (2006).
12
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), Requirements Concerning Polar Class (2011),
available at: http://www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/Publications/Unified_requirements/PDF/UR_I_pdf410.pdf
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International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialised agency of the United Nations and the
competent organisation with respect to international shipping.13 Maritime autonomous surface
ships (MASS) have the potential of triggering new regulatory responses and the IMO is yet again
expected to lead that exercise.

Across the field of maritime regulation, a source of constant concern is the human factor
in vessel operations. Autonomous shipping has the potential to substantially reduce or even
remove the human factor in the operation and navigation of the ship, relegating it to a passive or
temporary on-board presence and even to fully shore-based monitoring and controlling role. The
role of automation ranges from support to human decision-making to autonomous decisionmaking. In setting standards and rules for shipping, maritime regulation has frequently been
concerned with the influence of human decision-making and conduct, by employing technologies
and processes to produce safety, environmental, and security outcomes. Autonomous shipping
has the potential to transfer human assessment and decision-making to artificial intelligence.
This entails the use of “algorithms, tools and techniques that mimic human learning to solve
specific problems” and “to recognize patterns in data, making predictions from previously
unseen data.”14 These systems will be able to generate and compute more data and significantly
enhance situational awareness, but will they be a replacement for human judgement?

(accessed on 18 September 2017). The IACS polar class requirements are implicitly adopted in the Polar Code, Part
I-A para. 1.2.10. The Code and related amendments to international conventions were adopted in stages: Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC), International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), MSC Resolution
385(94) of 21 November 2014, Report on its 94th Session, IMO Doc. 94/21/Add.1 (27 November 2014), Annex 6;
id., Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, as amended, in ibid., Annex
7. For a consolidated online edition of the Polar Code, see International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,
available at:
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOP
TED.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017).
13
The UNCLOS designates the IMO as the competent international organization with respect to international
shipping in numerous provisions. These are listed in ‘Competent or Relevant International Organizations’ under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin 31 (1996), 79 at 81 et seq.
14
“Machine Learning is a set of algorithms, tools, and techniques that mimic human learning to solve specific
problems. By analyzing existing data sets, machine learning can be used to recognize patterns in data, making
predictions from previously unseen data. The bigger the data set, the more complex the patterns the model can
recognize and the more accurate the predictions.”, Anon., Rolls-Royce to Use Google Machine Learning in Quest
for Autonomous Ships, gCaptain, 3 October 2017, available at: http://gcaptain.com/rolls-royce-to-use-googlemachine-learning-in-quest-for-autonomous-ships/ (accessed on 3 October 2017).

4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130453

There are good reasons to believe that unmanned and autonomous ships will not be
technologies of passing interest. There is a discernible declining interest in seafaring careers with
consequent trend towards shortage of seafarers. As ships have grown bigger, crews have become
smaller, working long hours and frequently performing tedious tasks, and having little if any
time for port visits because of fast cargo turnaround and security reasons. Crewing costs are one
of the most significant elements in a ship’s cost structure.15 Without a crew (at least permanent)
and in the absence of need of full crew quarters and design to enable safe movement on board,
the autonomous ship will be lighter and cheaper to build. Most passageways for crews will be
removed. Crew quarters will be minimised and perhaps even removed. When needed, crew space
may be containerised and installed temporarily into the ship. The bridge as conceived in
contemporary ships will be smaller and simpler. In addition to saving on crew salaries, there will
be savings on crew supplies and energy. The ship will have a slick design and will be equipped
with a complex array of sensors and instrumentation. Its design and absence of crew will make it
difficult for pirates to board. It will likely be navigated more accurately and consequently with
fewer errors, if any, than crewed vessels. It will consume less energy and produce fewer
greenhouse gas emissions. However, the deployment of autonomous ships could produce new
concerns, in particular with respect to the interaction with crewed ships in their vicinity and
cyber security.16
The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) has heeded a recent call to launch a
regulatory scoping exercise with respect to ‘maritime autonomous surface ships’ (MASS), the
term used in this article to capture the emerging technologies of unmanned and autonomous
ships.17 A multi-Member State submission highlighted the undesirability of leaving the
regulation of autonomous ships to the national level in the absence of an appropriate

15

In 2015, crew costs were the third highest cost at 17% after ship finance and competition costs, each at 22%. See
Anon., Ship Operating Costs Set to Rise, Maritime Executive, 30 October 2015, available at: http://maritimeexecutive.com/article/ship-operating-costs-set-to-rise (accessed on 18 September 2017).
16
The concern is that autonomous ships may become targets for hackers. In the recent hacking of MAERSK, the
company is reported to have lost $200-300 million. Danish insurer Tryg predicts that 90% of its clients will buy
cyber insurance, Stine Jacobsen, Rising Hacker Threat Will Trigger Boom in Cyber Crime Insurance, Tryg Says,
Reuters, 4 October 2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tryg-cyber/rising-hacker-threat-willtrigger-boom-in-cyber-crime-insurance-tryg-says-idUSKCN1C91MV (accessed on 4 October 2017).
17
MSC, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 98th Session, IMO Doc. MSC 98/23 (28 June 2017), 79.
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international framework.18 After all, as ‘the competent international organisation’ with respect to
international shipping matters, it is the responsibility of the IMO to develop and maintain the
international standards and rules necessary for safe navigation. The IMO has been requested to
identify regulations which preclude unmanned operations, regulations that do not apply to
unmanned operations because of the absence of a crew, and regulations which do not preclude
unmanned operations but which may need to be amended to take into consideration the operation
of MASS.19

Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to enquire whether the advent of MASS requires
mere incremental or adaptive regulation, or rather constitutes a game-changer requiring
substantial new regulatory directions, and further what might be consequences for the
international law of the sea with respect to provisions concerning navigation. This inquiry
explores what could or should be expected regulatory impacts when the human factor is reduced
or eliminated from decision-making with respect to ship operations where traditionally human
presence and control are presumed, required, and regulated with attendant legal consequences.
There is an emerging body of scholarship on the public and private law aspects of the subject and
it raises important questions with respect to the potential impacts in both fields.20 The focus of
this article is on public law aspects. This author argues that MASS have the potential to provide
new directions for international law and the IMO. As the MSC embarks on its scoping exercise
during the expected four sessions, this article explores the extent to which MASS are or can be
accommodated in contemporary regulation and explores areas of potential direct and indirect

18

Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Proposal for a Regulatory Scoping Exercise, Submitted by Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United
States, IMO Doc. MSC 98/20/2 (27 February 2017) (MASS Scoping Exercise). See also Impact of New and
Advancing Technologies to Maritime Transport and the Regulatory Framework, Submitted by Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and IMarEST, IMO Doc. MSC 98/22/7 (28 March 2017).
19
Ibid.
20
For example: Eric Van Hooydonk, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping: An Exploration, Journal of
International Maritime Law 20 (2014), 403; Paul W. Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace
Unmanned Vessel Technology, Tulane Maritime Law Journal 40 (2015-2016), 197; Hannah Stones, Objective and
Subjective Safety in Unmanned Shipping, Shipping and Trade Law (STL) 16 (9) (2016), 4; Trudi Hogg/Samrat
Ghosh, Autonomous Merchant Vessels: Examination of Factors that Impact the Effective Implementation of
Unmanned Ships, Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 8 (2016), 206; Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of
the Legal Status of Unmanned Commercial Vessels in U.S. Admiralty and Maritime Law, International Journal of
Machine Learning and Cybernetics 47 (2016), 123; Robert Veal/Michael Tsimplis, The Integration of Unmanned
Ships into the Lex Maritima, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly (2017), 303; Robert Veal,
Unmanned Ships on the IMO Work Agenda, STL 17 (5) (2017), 1.
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impacts. The article concludes with reflections on how well-positioned maritime regulation is, or
is not, with respect to the withdrawal of the human factor from shipping in favour of automated
systems and the possible implications for further legal development.

II.

Technology and Terminology

While the term used in this article is MASS, the terminology of autonomous ships is not yet
settled. The term ‘MASS’ appears in the initial discourse at the IMO, whereas industry circles
and scholarly literature have used other diverse terms, including ‘unmanned surface vessels’,
‘autonomous unmanned merchant vessels,’ ‘robot ships’, ‘crewless ships’, ‘unmanned ships’,
and ‘automated ships’, among others. In considering how MASS will impact contemporary
maritime regulation, an early task for the IMO will be terminological clarity and consistency.
Terminology has already triggered varying views, with some Member States preferring to define
the term to clarify the scope of the Organization’s future work, whereas others preferred to leave
definitional matters to a later stage.21
Automation in shipping is not a complete novelty. Various aspects of a ship’s operations
have been subject to automation for some time, such as automatic course-setting and certain
machinery functions in the engine room. MASS will navigate partially or fully without a master
and crew on board and with its control emanating from an automated system or through remote
means. The ship will be equipped with instrumentation and software programmes that will
ensure its accurate location, using global positioning (GPS) and automatic identification system
(AIS) transmission, and perform various functions. It will have situation awareness through
sensors and cameras that will serve as its eyes and ears, sensing the presence of other vessels, as
well as the usual radar so as to navigate in compliance with the rules of the road.22 The vessel
will be generating and receiving digital data via satellite communication. Algorithms will be at
heart of computerised autonomous decision-making for safe navigation. This technology may be

21

MSC (note 17), 79.
Thomas Porathe/Johannes Prison/Yemao Man, Situation Awareness in Remote Control Centres for Unmanned
Ships, paper presented at Human Factors in Ship Design & Operation, London, 26-27 February 2014, available at:
http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/194797/local_194797.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017).
22

7

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130453

employed to assist the crew on board or even to replace them, whether temporarily or for much
of, if not the whole voyage.
The term ‘unmanned’ does not necessarily entail the total absence of human intervention
in the navigation and operation of the vessel at sea. A concept advanced by a major research
project considers how the technology may be introduced with respect to bulk cargo carriage and
with safety outcomes at least comparable to manned ships.23 As bulkers have long voyages
usually without multiple port cargo drops, they would need a temporary crew and pilot only
during the port approach, berthing, and de-berthing. The long unmanned voyage would be
monitored remotely from a shore based control centre. Thus the ship may operate autonomously
for periods of time, but humans will be on standby for ready intervention if or when needed, or
the vessel may be remotely controlled and operated when needed.

Differently from the autonomous vessel, the remotely controlled vessel is directed from a
shore base. Thus, the traditional fully manned vessel and the concept of the fully autonomous
ship are two ends of a spectrum along which there is a range of vessels with differing degrees of
manning, remote control, and automation. A Danish study from an engineering perspective
describes the degrees of ship automation beyond manual navigation to include, in order of
increasing intensity, automatic course steering (on autopilot on the basis of a human encoded
course), decision-support (the system provides information for a human decision), remotely
operated navigation (off-board instructions for autopilot and machinery), remote monitoring (full
off-board situational ship awareness – radar, digital, TV-monitoring – to enable remote
controlled navigation), partial autonomy (on-board partial decision-making autonomy to inform
on-board/off-board officer of navigation decisions), and full autonomy (full situation awareness,
assessment, and decision-making without human intervention).24

23

Hans-Christoph Burmeister/Wilko Bruhn/Ørnulf Jan Rødseth/Thomas Porathe, Autonomous Unmanned
Merchant Vessel and its Contribution towards the e-Navigation Implementation: The MUNIN Perspective,
International Journal of e-Navigation and Maritime Economy 1 (2014), 1.
24
Mogens Blanke/Michael Henriques/Jakob Bang, A Pre-Analysis on Autonomous Ships (2016), 3, available at:
https://www.dma.dk/Documents/Publikationer/Autonome%20skibe_DTU_rapport_UK.pdf (accessed on 18
September 2017).
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The early legal discourse on MASS raised the question whether the autonomous vessel is
in fact a ‘ship’ as generally understood in international maritime law in order to ascertain its
legal status and application of the various public and private maritime law conventions.25 While
‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ are used interchangeably in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS),26 they are not defined in that instrument. Rather, the search for definitions leads
to the international maritime conventions, several of which are considered below, but without
attempting an exhaustive listing. In most cases the term ‘ship’ is defined and the definition
includes ‘vessel(s)’ having specific characteristics and/or performing particular functions for the
purpose of delimiting the scope and application of the instrument concerned. A perusal of several
of these instruments illustrates the drafting practice. In the marine pollution conventions, ‘ship’
is defined as or includes: “any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever”;27 “a vessel of any type
whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms”;28 “any sea-going vessel
and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk
as cargo […]”;29 “a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and
includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type”;30 “a
vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats,
air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, fixed or floating platforms, floating storage
units (FSUs) and floating production storage and off-loading units (FPSOs)”;31 and “a vessel of
any type whatsoever operating in the aquatic environment and includes submersibles, floating

25

For example see Comité Maritime International (CMI), CMI International Working Group Position Paper on
Unmanned Ships and the International Regulatory Framework, 2017, 3, available at:
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Questionnaires/CMI%20Position%20Paper%20on%20Unmanned%20Ship
s.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017).
26
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UNTS 1833, 396 (UNCLOS).
27
Art. II (2) International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,
29 November 1969, UNTS 970, 211; Art. 1 (1) International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage, 23 March 2001, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/19 (27 March 2001); Art. 1 (1) International Convention on
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by
Sea, 2 May 1996, ILM 35, 1406.
28
Art. 2 (4) MARPOL.
29
Art. I (1) CLC Convention. An identical definition is included in Art. I (1) IOPCF Convention.
30
Art. 2 (3) International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 30 November
1990, UNTS 1891, 51.
31
Art. 2 (9) International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, 5 October 2001,
IMO Doc. AFS/CONF/26 Annex (18 October 2001) (AFS Convention).
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craft, floating platforms, FSUs and FPSOs”.32 In a maritime security convention, ‘ship’ is
defined as “a vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including
dynamically supported craft, submersibles, or any floating craft.”33 The definitions of ‘ship’ for
maritime carriage purposes include: “vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea”;34 “only a seagoing vessel, excluding air-cushion vehicle”;35 “any self-propelled sea-going vessel used in
international seaborne trade for the transport of goods, passengers, or both with the exception of
less than 500 gross registered tons”.36 They share the common themes of ‘sea-going’ and/or
performing marine transportation. It is unusual for ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ to be inverted, as in the
case of a salvage convention where “vessel means any ship or craft or any structure capable of
navigation”37 and collision avoidance rules where ‘vessel’ is defined to include “every
description of water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of
being used as a means of transport on water.”38 However, for the purpose of the discussion of
autonomous ships the difference is immaterial and none of the definitions provided above pose a
problem for the consideration of autonomous vessels as ‘ships’.

Accordingly, the ship will be subject to domestic and international safety, environmental
and security regulations. The rules and standards will govern its entire life from construction,
through operations, and eventual recycling. Its operational life will include rules with respect to
its seaworthiness and crewing. The private law consequences include the generation of liens
unique to ships, the ability of a creditor to arrest and proceed in rem against the ship, and the
ability of the owner, among other related interests in the ship, to enjoy certain defences, most
especially limitation of liability. The ship is a piece of property that enjoys a status unique to
maritime law. The early conceptions and prototypes of MASS clearly foresee vessels that
perform the full range of functions of ships that are fully manned. The distinctive characteristics

32

Art. 1 (12) International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 13
February 2004, IMO Doc. BWM/CONF/36 (16 February 2004) (BWM Convention).
33
Art. 1 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March
1988, UNTS 1678, 201.
34
Art. 2 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of Liability of
Owners of Seagoing Vessels, 25 August 1924, LNTS 120, 123.
35
Art. 1 (3) Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 13 December
1974, UNTS 1463, 20.
36
Art. 2 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 7 February 1986, ILM 26, 1229.
37
Art. 1 (b) International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, UNTS 1953, 165.
38
Rule 3 (a) COLREGS.
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are the absence of a crew and in the case of a fully autonomous vessel, the relegation of decisionmaking to an automated system. While factoring the withdrawal of the human element, there is
not much reason not to consider MASS as capable to produce most of the legal consequences
usually associated with ships. Rather than with definitional concerns, the focus should be on the
impact of the absence of or lessened human element on particular institutions that are premised
on human appraisal, judgement, and decision-making.

III.

Implications for the International Law of the Sea

MASS are likely to raise some questions of interpretation and application of the conventional
and customary law of the sea, in particular the UNCLOS of 1982. The key question posed is the
extent to which the pertinent UNCLOS regimes are sufficiently broad so as to seamlessly support
the advent of MASS, or whether the characteristics of these new technologies require revisiting
of the assumptions and expected applications of particular rules. Of special interest are regimes
where MASS enjoy navigational rights as all other ships and jurisdictional powers with respect
to international shipping based on the assumption that ships are manned, more specifically with
respect to flag, coastal, and port States. At first blush, the frequent reference to the generic terms
‘vessel’ or ‘ship’ in the UNCLOS suggests that the provisions concerned apply to all ships
including MASS. However, a probing analysis of some provisions raises potential issues.39

A. Flag State

The flag State has a right to register any class of ship and by doing so will be extending the
application of its laws and protections to the ship wherever it navigates.40 The question as to
whether a national register of shipping is able to accommodate MASS is not an issue in the
UNCLOS and indeed for many flag States that do not require manning as a condition for the
registration of a ship. Registration requirements usually include ship name, IMO number,
ownership, technical particulars, whether the vessel is on a bareboat charter, whether the vessel’s
previous registration is terminated, and also mortgages or hypothecs on the ship and their status.

39
40

MSC (note 17), 79.
Arts. 91-92 UNCLOS.
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If registration of MASS ships is an issue for some States, it is likely because of domestic
requirements. Once a vessel is entered into the register of ships, the flag State commences to
enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over those vessels when they are on the high seas,41 concurrent
jurisdiction with coastal States during the exercise of innocent passage,42 transit passage,43
archipelagic sea lanes, and innocent passage in archipelagic waters,44 and concurrent jurisdiction
with port States when ships are voluntarily in a foreign port.45 The flag State has a right to
provide them with consular assistance in foreign ports.46

The right to establish a ship register is accompanied by the duty to effectively exercise
jurisdiction and control over MASS entered into the register.47 The actions usually associated
with this power would need to be reconsidered in the case of unmanned ships. If the ship does
not carry a crew the exercise of jurisdiction and control will be expected to focus on
administrative and technical, rather than the maritime labour aspects (master, officers, and crew)
as would be the case with crewed ships.48 As the technology of MASS develops, it is conceivable
that new rules (international and domestic) governing the desired competencies and capabilities
of the shore-board personnel responsible as well as the instrumentation for the remote or
automated navigation of the ship, including communications, will be needed.49

More of an issue in the UNCLOS is the duty of the flag State to

take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with
regard, inter alia, to: (a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; (b) the
manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking into account the
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applicable international instruments; (c) the use of signals, the maintenance of
communications and the prevention of collisions.50

The contemplated measures include requirements concerning technology of the
traditional ship used by an on-board crew, rather than MASS. For example, the measures are
expected to include on-board “charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment and
instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship.”51 While a fully autonomous
ship will have navigation equipment, it may not have charts on board, but rather will be able to
download chart and navigational data as pre-programmed and as needed. Admittedly, electronic
charts, digital manuals useable online, and electronic notices to shipping are now already in
widespread use.

A more difficult requirement for the flag State is to ensure

that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate
qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, communications and marine
engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type,
size, machinery and equipment of the ship.52

Simply stated, the rule requires the ship to have qualified personnel on-board. One could argue
that the crew requirement in this rule is relative to the type of ship and machinery, and if the ship
is partially or fully automated, then it follows that a crew is not needed all of the time, if at all,
without violating the rule. Thus, the practise of using towed, but unmanned barges for carriage of
goods is of long standing. Further, if the fundamental purpose of the manning requirement is to
ensure that there is competent operation and navigation of the vessel, it could be argued that a
MASS vessel could be competently operated and navigated in a remote or autonomous manner
where it can be demonstrated that safety, environmental protection, and security are assured at
least to the same extent as with a manned vessel. For remotely operated vessels, “in the charge
of” could be constructively interpreted to include the shore-based team of professionals in charge
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of the vessel’s navigation, but presumably the standard of human competence still applies to the
shore-based team. Arguing that the element of human control is nonetheless manifested in the
writer who creates the algorithm appears to stretch too far because the autonomous ship is
expected to operate with ongoing human control.

A similar interpretation issue arises with respect to remotely controlled and autonomous
warships. The definition of ‘warships’, while specifically requiring that they are under the armed
forces of a State, further specifies that they are “under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service
list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.”53
However, warships are excepted from the mandatory application of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974 (SOLAS Convention)54 and the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers of 1978 (STCW
Convention).55

The rule

that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with
and required to observe the applicable international regulations concerning the safety of
life at sea, the prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of marine
pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio56

is a challenge for ships in autonomous mode and will be considered further below. For
remotely controlled ships, and as discussed in the previous paragraph, the shore-based team
could be argued to provide the human constructive presence and expertise underlying this
requirement. However, for autonomous ships it is difficult to argue that the algorithm substitutes
53
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the requirement for fully-conversant master, officers, and crew in this provision. As for the
communications aspect, which entails an ability for other vessels and public authorities to
communicate with the vessel, the shore-based personnel behind a remotely controlled ship could
conceivably perform this function. This constructive interpretation of the UNCLOS provisions
does not easily extend to vessels in autonomous mode because decision-making is left to
algorithms, rather than to direct human decision-making, and two-way communication involving
a machine on the autonomous vessel and humans on vessels in its vicinity (for instance using
very high frequency radio (VHF) to avoid close quarters) may not be possible, let alone
desirable.
In performing these duties, the flag State “is required to conform to generally accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary
to secure their observance.”57 This provision invokes international regulations that may only be
adopted by the IMO and at this time the pertinent maritime conventions do not directly address
the particular requirements and perhaps exemptions (for example from manning requirements)
that will be needed for MASS ships.

Flag States are required to ensure compliance of their ships with international rules and
standards and provide for effective enforcement.58 This duty extends to preventing their ships
from operating unless they comply with requirements for design, construction, and manning,59
and to require them to carry on board certificates which may be required under various
conventions, 60 such as SOLAS61 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships of 1973/78 (MARPOL).62 While some documentation is already available
in digital format and there is a trend towards passive interactive ship-shore reporting, the
operationalisation of the rule concerning documentation on board MASS will need to be
reconsidered when an inspecting coastal or port State authority official requests the certificates,
as will be seen below with respect to port State control.
57
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Another constraint with respect to MASS is the flag State’s responsibility under the
UNCLOS to require the master of a ship to offer assistance to persons in distress at sea,63 also a
duty under SOLAS.64 This duty includes assistance to persons, deviating from the established
course to proceed with speed to the rescue of persons in distress, and rendering assistance to the
other ship involved in a collision. It is difficult to see how an unmanned ship can discharge this
humanitarian duty, other than, perhaps, for the shore-based team to notify rescue services in the
area of the incident and leave the MASS vessel in the area just in case search and rescue
response services need to use the vessel as a platform, if appropriate.

In summary, the rules concerning duties of the flag State in the UNCLOS reflect a
combination of the need for constructive interpretation of some provisions and addressing
regulatory gaps with respect to ships that are unmanned. They potentially pose a problem for the
flag State in the exercise of effective jurisdiction and control if the duty to ensure the manning of
ships is interpreted literally as a requirement to have crew members on board of the MASS.
However, if the deployment of a temporary crew for port approach navigation, berthing, and deberthing, and a shore-based team for the long stretches of navigation of the vessel are interpreted
constructively to be the equivalent of the actual manning in the case of remotely controlled ships,
the gap is effectively removed. The same cannot be said for fully autonomous ships if these
indeed become a reality, thus leaving a gap that would need to be addressed through other
means.

B. Coastal State
The coastal State’s limited jurisdiction over ships exercising the rights of innocent passage
through the territorial sea, sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters, and transit passage
through straits used for international navigation extends to all ships, but not to warships.65 The
coastal State may adopt laws and regulations to govern innocent passage in the territorial sea
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(and archipelagic waters)66 with respect to safety of navigation,67 and in doing so must not apply
“design, construction, manning or equipment [standards] unless they are giving effect to
generally accepted international rules or standards.”68 At this time, neither the UNCLOS (supra)
nor SOLAS (infra) exempts ships from actual manning requirements. In theory, a coastal State
could regulate a manning requirement for MASS in transit, especially in areas of heavy traffic,
because in doing so it would not be applying a standard other than a generally accepted
international manning standard. An analogous argument could be made with respect to laws and
regulations for pollution prevention.69 With respect to transit passage, the coastal State has less
flexibility in finding issues with MASS because its laws and regulations must “not discriminate
in form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying,
hampering or impairing the rights of passage […]”70 The UNCLOS text in this part does not
provide the coastal State with a justification to impose a manning requirement.

There are potential difficulties that coastal States could face in undertaking enforcement
action in accordance with UNCLOS. In undertaking enforcement action against MASS that
violate pollution prevention laws applicable in the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) when they are voluntarily in its port, the coastal State has to contend with a scenario
where it is unclear whether there is a human person behind the violation and, if there is, how to
exercise jurisdiction over a human person (or corporation) who may not be within its territorial
jurisdiction, despite the vessel’s voluntary presence.71 The coastal State has the power to
undertake physical inspection of MASS, and where the evidence so warrants, it may detain such
vessels although there are no persons on board.72 It could be difficult for the coastal State to pin
responsibility to a specific person. A commonly applied practical approach to pollution offences
is strict liability, so that the actus reus alone will be sufficient to proceed against the ship.
Another challenge is how a coastal State authority is to communicate with MASS when
unmanned. When it has clear grounds to believe that there is a pollution incident, the coastal
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State may require such a vessel to provide “information on its identity and port of registry, its
last and its next port of call and other relevant information required to establish whether a
violation has occurred.”73 While communication with a remotely operated vessel should not be
an issue because there will be contact with a shore-based crew, two-way communication with a
vessel in autonomous mode could be difficult when inspectors need to conduct a lengthy
exchange unless a shore-based team intervenes. The power of a coastal State to conduct a
physical inspection could be constrained.74 The first stage of physical inspection is limited to an
examination of on-board certificates, records, or other documents,75 which as seen earlier may
simply be digital. A second and more probing inspection stage may be undertaken if there are
issues with such documents, and where it is established that a violation has occurred, the vessel
has a right to release after reasonable procedures are completed, such as posting of a bond or
other appropriate financial security, just like any other ship.76 The coastal State may refuse
release only exceptionally or release conditionally, notifying the flag State in such eventualities,
who in turn may still seek prompt release.77

A potentially more complex issue for a coastal State is a scenario where MASS are in
need of assistance and request refuge in a port or safe waters of that State. The custom of
providing refuge to ships in distress has been narrowed down in State practice to humanitarian
assistance.78 An unmanned ship does not need humanitarian assistance, but its cargo could be
very valuable and the vessel’s distressed condition could be such as to threaten the marine
environment. Although the coastal State has rights of self-protection under conventional law, it
will be guided by the IMO Guidelines for Ships in Need of Assistance.79 While the guidelines
are clearly voluntary, they are increasingly considered as good practice for risk-based decisionmaking. However, the problem with the guidelines is that they assume that the vessel in need of
assistance has a master and crew on board, and that usually the vessel will be receiving salvage
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assistance as well. The guidelines establish a communications process between the three parties
to enable coastal State decision-makers to decide on refuge. Usually, the master and crew will be
the persons who have first and most in-depth knowledge of the condition of the ship. The
absence of such persons on board the vessel could constrain the decision-making process on
refuge.

C. Port State
The port State’s concern with MASS is with respect to the enforcement of international rules and
standards and responding to the requests of other States concerning the autonomous vessel
‘voluntarily’ in its port.80 The notice of arrival, which can be verbal or electronic, constitutes an
indication of the intention to enter port. When a vessel is selected for inspection, there is usually
communication between the port State control inspector and the ship master. Presumably, such
communication may be undertaken with the shore-based team, but the inspector will need to
board the ship. Usually, the inspector will board and personally communicate with the master or
officer on watch (OOW). If the autonomous vessel does not have personnel on board in the
foreign port, it is conceivable that the ship’s agent, usually appointed to act on behalf of its
interests in a foreign port, may need to step in. However, the ship agent is usually a commercial,
rather than a person with technical knowledge of the ship as a crew member. Thus the
inspector’s questions may need to be directed to persons who are not present on the ship during
the inspection, or simply wait until such persons are available.

When an autonomous vessel is port-inspected and found to have discharged wastes in
violation of international standards, there is the further enforcement constraint with respect to
who to proceed against when the ‘person’ responsible for the discharge is outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the port State. The UNCLOS does not indicate what persons would be
pursued in the institution of proceedings and the vessel is personified in the sense that it is
expected to comply with the inspection.81 The port State has the power to detain the vessel to
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persuade the person(s) concerned to submit to jurisdiction. The port State would need to inform
the flag State.

IV.

Implications for International Maritime Law

The article now considers the potential impact of MASS on the international maritime legal
system. Consisting of conventions and other legal instruments of the IMO, international maritime
regulation addresses all ships and is largely premised on a human presence on board and in
control of the navigation of the ship, as well as performing contingent functions such as
provision of notices, log book entries, reporting, and responding to distress calls for assistance.
The provision of certain services to ships is also premised on human interaction, such as in the
case of pilotage where the master and OOW cooperate with the pilot in formulating the passage
plan and taking and executing navigation instructions. The human element is underscored by
trained crews. For the purposes of the present discussion, a selection of salient instruments and
provisions are discussed to exemplify the potential impacts of MASS on contemporary maritime
regulation, while acknowledging that a comprehensive analysis of all IMO regulations will be
needed to ascertain the full regulatory impact of MASS.

A. Maritime Safety

The SOLAS Convention constitutes the backbone of international maritime safety regulation.
Through fourteen chapters and numerous codes, it sets out standards, inter alia, for ship
construction, machinery, cargo handling, stability, life-saving equipment and procedures,
radiocommunications, safe carriage of cargoes and oil fuels, carriage of dangerous goods,
additional standards for specific types of vessels (e.g., nuclear ships, bulk carriers, high speed
craft), safe navigation, management for safe ship operations, maritime security, and polar
shipping. In principle, and whatever function they perform, MASS will be captured by a range of
SOLAS rules and standards. SOLAS establishes a comprehensive system for the inspection,
surveying, and certification requirements for ships to ensure compliance with international
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standards.82 The principal issues that MASS raise are with respect to safety aspects where the
human factor is concerned.
As observed in the earlier discussion with respect to the flag State’s duties under the
UNCLOS, a key SOLAS rule provides that “Contracting Governments undertake, each for its
national ships, to maintain, or, if it is necessary, to adopt measures for the purposes of ensuring
that, from the point of view of safety of life at sea, all ships shall be sufficiently and efficiently
manned”.83 The intention of this rule is to ensure that all ships are sufficiently manned to ensure
they can operate safely. Crewing is equated with the safety outcome. An interpretation of this
provision analogous to the earlier discussion on a similar requirement in Article 94 (3) UNCLOS
is that as long as safety outcomes at least comparable to, if not exceeding, manned vessels, can
be achieved by MASS vessels, the intended outcome of the rule is achieved. The presence of a
shore-based team in remote control or standby (or an on-board crew on standby) and temporary
crews on unmanned autonomous ships provides the overseeing human element implicit in this
rule. Naturally, to remove any doubt, it would be preferable for this manning rule to be amended
to reflect the needs of MASS.

The application of SOLAS principles and standards relating to bridge design and location
of equipment are premised on personnel manning the bridge.84 The ergonomics should be such
as to facilitate the “tasks to be performed by the bridge team and the pilot in making full
appraisal of the situation and in navigating the ship safely under all operational conditions” and
“safe and effective bridge resource management.”85 As observed earlier, MASS will be guided
by a different bridge concept, possibly much smaller for fully autonomous vessels in the event a
crew is needed on board, and with a shore-based equivalent. This is important from another
perspective. In gathering information on navigational conditions, the ship is also in a position,
and indeed has a duty, to relay information on any dangerous conditions encountered. Thus the
master has a duty to communicate to ships in the vicinity and competent authorities any danger
messages concerning the presence of dangerous ice, dangerous derelict, other direct danger to

82

Ch. I SOLAS Convention.
Ch. V, Reg. 14 SOLAS Convention.
84
Ch. V, Reg. 15 SOLAS Convention.
85
Ibid.
83

21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130453

navigation, tropical storm, encounters with sub-freezing air temperatures associated with gales,
and winds of force 10 or above on the Beaufort scale not forecasted.86 At this time it is unclear
how MASS would comply with the danger message rule.

It is likely that the new international standards would need to be developed and regulated
for the new instrumentation and processes that will replace these human tasks. At this time
SOLAS does not have rules addressing the shore-based control room. In remotely controlled and
autonomous vessels, the bridge and watch tasks performed by humans will be replaced by a suite
of sensors and daytime and infrared cameras in addition to the usual instrumentation, such as
radar and AIS, to enable processing of complex data streams and enable full appraisal of the
ship’s location and situation. Rules concerning the maintenance of a watch during the operation
of the vessel are currently premised on crew presence. While at sea a ship is required to maintain
a continuous watch, including a radio watch for broadcasts of maritime safety information.87 For
watch purposes, SOLAS requires that every ship shall carry personnel qualified for distress and
safety radiocommunication.88 The pertinent rules would need to be adapted to enable
performance of watch functions by the off-board team responsible for the ship or to permit
automated task performance.

With no crew, the vessel might not need the usual number of survival craft. The rules
concerning the manning of survival craft would have contingent (in the event the vessel is
boarded), if any application. The general rule for all ships is that they have a sufficient number of
trained persons on board for mustering and assisting untrained persons, and a sufficient number
of crew members must be available for launching an on-board survival craft.89 MASS could
justify an exemption from or modification of these rules.
The International Convention on Load Lines of 1966 (LLC),90 another vital maritime
safety instrument, in addition to setting out rules for the safe loading of ships, further provides
86
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for construction standards to ensure safe work and passage spaces on board. The LLC has
provisions for the protection of the crew, such as standards for deckhouses for accommodation,
guard rails, safe passageways, and stowage of cargo in a manner to permit safe crew passage,91
which might not be required in the design and construction of MASS to the same extent. It is
likely that an exemption for MASS will be also be required in this instrument.

B. Crew Training, Certification, and Work Conditions

The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers of 1978 (STCW Convention) is the principal international maritime instrument
dedicated to the training and certification of seafarers. The Convention establishes that “each
Administration shall require every company to ensure that its ships are manned in compliance
with the applicable safe manning requirements of the Administration”.92 Shipping companies93
are responsible for the manning of their ships in compliance with the Convention and that
properly certificated seafarers are assigned for service on their ships.94 The ship’s complement
must be able to “effectively co-ordinate their activities in an emergency situation and in
performing functions vital to safety or to the prevention or mitigation of pollution.”95 Levels of
safe manning are further addressed by the Principles of Minimum Safe Manning.96

In theory, where MASS are fully autonomous, they will render redundant the application
of much of the STCW Convention, as well as the important Maritime Labour Convention of
2006 (MLC) which promotes the rights of seafarers and establishes a framework for conditions
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of employment and occupational health and safety on ships.97 Where MASS have crews
deployed temporarily, the STCW Convention and MLC will apply. The MLC protections are
likely not extendable to the team operating MASS from shore as the definition of seafarer
presumes work at sea.98 In practice, there are a number of vital functions performed on board the
ship, both in normal and emergency situations pursuant to SOLAS and articulated in terms of
personnel requirements, that would need to be addressed by MASS and the teams responsible for
their operation or for overseeing the systems that run the vessels. The potential impact of
automation is already recognised in the framework for determining minimum safe manning, in
particular that functions on board a ship “may increase or decrease manning levels depending on
availability and appropriate procedures and of specific capability enabling
technology/automation.”99

The usual personnel training requirements reflect the various functions on board the ship.
For deck operations, the rules include mandatory minimum requirements for officers in charge of
the navigational watch on ships of 500 gross tonnage (GRT) or more100 as well as for
certification of masters and chief mates for ships of both more and less than 500 GRT,101 and
certification of ratings.102 There are similar requirements for the engine room department. The
rules include certification on the engineering watch both in manned and, when on duty, in
unmanned engine rooms,103 and mandatory minimum requirements for certification of ratings on
the watch in manned engine-rooms and, when periodically on duty, in unmanned enginerooms.104 The recent updating of standards to reflect the reality that ships may have unmanned
engine rooms for prolonged periods is evidence that certain ship functions are already capable of
full automation. Requirements for radiocommunications and radio personnel include mandatory
minimum requirements for certification for Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
(GMDSS).105 There are also mandatory minimum special personnel training requirements for
97
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certain classes of ships, such as tankers, ro-ro ships, and passenger vessels.106 A vital rule in the
Convention is that “a safe continuous watch or watches appropriate to the prevailing
circumstances and conditions are maintained in all seagoing ships at all times”107 under the
direction of the master. The interpretation of ‘watch’ functions with respect to SOLAS are
relevant here as well.

The STCW Convention effectively defines the standards of competence expected of all
human-performed functions on-board at all times. The Convention ensures human competence in
decision-making. While MASS will largely shed off the human component and integrate the
various functions into a single system, they are still expected to produce comparable safety,
environmental, and security outcomes as manned ships. During the voyage, the system, whether
overseen remotely from off-board and/or in an automated manner, provides centralised overview
and management of all ship operations. While in port, MASS would be serviced and maintained
as other ships. With respect to shore-based personnel monitoring and/or in control of MASS,
‘competence’ will continue to be a requirement, although the precise content will need to be
redefined and adapted. The shore-based personnel will be highly qualified personnel in
navigational, engineering, and informatics aspects of the vessel. Standards for their training and
certification will likely need to be enhanced. In the case of fully automated vessels, autonomous
decision-making introduces a novel approach to ‘competence’ and it is likely that new technical
standards will need to be developed.

Also, and as observed earlier, the STCW rules on manning requirements do not apply to
warships. The exception applies to “warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or
operated by a State and engaged only on governmental non-commercial service.”108 This
exception is accompanied by an important proviso to the effect that “each Party shall ensure by
the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of
such ships owned or operated by it, that the persons serving on board such ships meet the
requirements of the Convention so far as is reasonable and practicable.”109
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C. The ‘Rules of the Road’
The ‘rules of the road’ for the safe navigation of ships are set out in the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972 (COLREGS) and apply to the
high seas and all navigable waters.110 The COLREGS include core rules for safe navigation (Part
A – general; Part B – steering and sailing rules) in conditions of normal and reduced visibility
and signalling to other ships in the vicinity (Part C – lights and shapes; Part D – sound and light
signals). The rules nourish the standard of good seamanship expected of the ordinary mariner
and against which the standard of care in the navigation of a vessel is assessed. Thus the rules
provide no basis for exemptions from compliance with the rules or from exercising the
precaution necessary and expected in the ordinary practice of seamen.111

Although unmanned, MASS are required to observe the COLREGS and the underlying
standard of good seamanship. The rules are explicit in their reference to vessels and therefore do
not provide any immediate problem of textual interpretation. The definition of vessel as “every
description of water craft” used or capable of being used as means of transportation over water
easily covers MASS.112 MASS will not be expected to enjoy special privileges. They do not
qualify as vessels ‘not under command’, which enjoy the privilege of a stand-on vessel, because
this technical term refers only to “a vessel which through some exceptional circumstance is
unable to manoeuvre as required by these Rules and is therefore unable to keep out of the way of
another vessel.”113 Rather, the issues that could arise likely stem from how they would be applied
when an autonomous vessel is in the vicinity of other vessels and the potential legal
consequences.

In general, the Part B rules apply to MASS without significant issues of interpretation.
The steering rules require that every vessel must maintain a proper look-out in any condition of
visibility. This is described as “by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate
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in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and
of the risk of collision.”114 As described earlier, MASS will be equipped with a sophisticated
system of technologies for full situational awareness, including geopositioning, radar, sensors,
and continuous streaming cameras, all generating data for an algorithm to translate into
information and advice for human or automated decision-making. In theory, automation will be
able to more accurately navigate the vessel and avoid the human element contribution to
maritime collisions and allisions. There is a lesson to be learned from over-reliance on
technology for safe navigation. Following the introduction of radar on board ships, there were
numerous radar-assisted collisions that were ultimately attributed to poor look-out. Seafarers at
the time misused radar or over-relied on its use, thus refraining from using all means available to
determine the position of other vessels and communicate with them if necessary to avoid close
quarters.115 There could also be complex legal consequences in determining contributory
negligence and consequential liabilities, in particular where the vessel is fully automated. In
collision cases, unlike allisions, it is often the case that the collision is the result of negligence on
the part of both ships involved.

Another rule whose operationalisation will need careful consideration concerns the risk
of collision and the action to be taken to avoid close quarters. The vessel has the duty to “use all
available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk
of collision exists” and in case of doubt to deem that a risk of collision exists.116 The rule is
supported by further rules concerning the proper use of radar (learning from radar-assisted
collisions) and avoiding of assumptions on scanty information. This rule relies heavily on data
inputs on traffic within the vicinity of the vessel, general conditions of navigation (e.g. weather,
visibility, ice presence, etc.), proper use of equipment, and intelligent judgement. It is argued that
MASS will be better able to collect data and make intelligent decisions.117 In less than optimal
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conditions when information is scanty, the extent to which human experience and judgement
call, accompanied by good seamanship, can be replaced by an algorithm remains to be seen.

The Part C rules on lights and shapes, respectively for night time and day time sailing,
will apply. These rules are important to enable vessels in each other’s vicinity to recognise their
respective status and privilege and apply the respective rule for stand-on and give-way vessels
while ensuring safe distances. While not granting them any special privilege, the introduction of
dedicated new lights and shapes for MASS ships to indicate their presence to other vessels in
their vicinity could be sensible and precautionary additions to the rules. The Part D rules on
sounds and signals also apply, although the actual operation of manoeuvring and warning whistle
blasts and light signals would be done remotely or automatically.

D. Environment Protection

The absence of crews on MASS can be expected to produce impacts on environmental regulation
with respect to on-board procedures, waste management, and reporting requirements. Again,
examples are provided to highlight the point. MARPOL Annex I on-board requirements for the
master or crew’s familiarity with essential shipboard procedures relating to the prevention of
pollution by oil in the case of unmanned ships would need to be reviewed to enable a port State
inspector to ascertain compliance with requirements in some other manner.118 The absence of a
crew might significantly reduce the relevance of Annexes IV and V respectively concerning
sewage and garbage. There would be a strong argument to consider the granting of exemptions
from certain certification requirements with respect to these wastes. An analogous issue was
recently considered by the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MPEC) with
respect to proposed amendments to introduce certain exemptions from MARPOL Annexes I, IV,
and VI survey and certification requirements for unmanned non-self-propelled barges.119 The
reasoning was that these unmanned barges do not have structures or equipment that generate
pollutants addressed by MARPOL, such as sewage, and that the added administrative
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requirements, such as issuing and carrying the required International Sewage Pollution
Prevention Certificate, were unnecessary. Among other, this was relevant for the implementation
of the III Code in the conduct of the audits of Annexes for compliance with instruments covered
by that code and port State inspection.120 The MEPC decided against an open-ended exemption,
and favoured a capped exemption of no more than five years, despite views to the contrary.121

In addition to MARPOL, other environmental conventions could be impacted with
respect to functions to be performed by the crew. In particular, the International Convention for
the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments of 2004 prescribes that some
officers and crew be familiar with the Ballast Water Management Plan and their duties in ballast
water management operations on their ship.122 In the case of MASS this knowledge expectation
will need to be transferred to the shore-based personnel or even performed autonomously.

V.

Discussion

This article has identified several issues concerning potential impacts of MASS on the
international law of the sea and international maritime law. The pertinent UNCLOS
jurisdictional frameworks relevant for MASS were set out, while the IMO conventions that
nourish that framework and the nitty-gritty international rules and standards were considered.
Functioning together, the two systems ensure that international navigation rights enjoyed by all
ships are protected and that the exercise of jurisdiction over international shipping is within that
framework and in accordance with generally accepted international maritime rules and standards.
The advent of MASS, although potentially accommodated, has been demonstrated to challenge
the application of particular rules of the two systems. While there is room for interpreting
affected rules in the conventions in a manner consistent with the general rules for the
interpretation of treaties,123 there are also gaps that are not easily addressed through
120
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interpretation alone. Moreover, in the interest of clarity, amendment of a rule might be preferable
to waiting for an interpretation from an authoritative body.

The respective abilities of the UNCLOS and IMO conventions to respond to the change
in the operational environment of shipping and navigation promised by MASS are different. In
the event the manning requirements in Article 94 UNCLOS cannot be waived through a
functional interpretation, it could be difficult to amend the Convention. While the UNCLOS has
amendment procedures, they have not been utilised to date and change to the Convention has
been effected through separate implementation agreements adopted after laborious diplomatic
processes.124 However, the UNCLOS has a simplified procedure, as yet untested, that could
potentially be used to address technical changes to Article 94. A State party would need to
propose an amendment for adoption through the simplified procedure, communicated to the UN
Secretary-General who in turn communicates the proposal to all States parties, and in the event
of no objection being lodged by a State party within a period of one year, the amendment would
be adopted.125 Should interpretation or amendment of Article 94 UNCLOS not be possible,
future State practice in registering MASS vessels and exercising effective jurisdiction and
control over them to the same extent as manned ships could well provide a customary law basis
for accommodating automated ships.126

In comparison, IMO regulation is substantially more adaptable because several of the key
instruments affected by MASS have tacit amendment procedures. The MEPC and MSC, as the
two key committees tasked with the maintenance of the safety and environmental conventions
for which the IMO is responsible, have the necessary authority and machinery to amend the
technical aspects of safety and environmental conventions using the simplified tacit acceptance
procedure following consideration by the pertinent committee, instead of a diplomatic
conference convened by the Organization.127 However, a potential issue for the IMO is how to
eliminate the manning requirement for fully autonomous ships in a manner that retains
Specifically with respect to Part VII’s provisions on straddling stocks and highly migratory species and Part XI
provisions on deep seabed mining.
125
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consistency with a provision to the contrary in Article 94 UNCLOS,128 unless the text can be
interpreted to accommodate MASS as discussed earlier.

The IMO is well poised and advised to proactively address the regulatory needs of
MASS. As other studies, this article has observed that while much of the IMO regulatory system
will be able to accommodate this new class(es) of vessels, it is very likely that there are many
rules and standards in several maritime conventions that will need to be adapted through
interpretation or amendment. The IMO’s strategic directions provide for keeping “under review
the technical and operational safety aspects of all types of ships”,129 which will include MASS. It
oversees the maintenance of a regulatory system to promote harmonisation and facilitate
compliance with its instruments. Hence, the multi-Member State proposal for a regulatory
scoping exercise of the Organization’s instruments is timely130 and the initial approach defined
by the MSC appropriate.131 The IMO will take a proactive approach that will explore a range of
impacts of surface vessels employing different levels of automation, including on safety,
security, ports, pilotage, and incident response, including legal responsibility and liability
issues.132

One can speculate on what precise regulatory changes will be necessary. Degrees of
automation with respect to aspects of ship operation have been gradually introduced over time,
but automation on a large scale as in the case of MASS has not yet been considered by the IMO.
Given the multiple points of impact of MASS on maritime regulations discussed in this article, at
a minimum the approach to adaptation should be systemic, rather than a piecemeal convention
by convention, code by code approach. Hence, a comprehensive impact review of all of the IMO
The IMO Committees “when exercising the functions conferred upon it by or under any international convention
or other instrument, shall conform to the relevant provisions of the convention or instrument in question.”, Art. 31
(on the MSC) and Art. 41 (on the MEPC) Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 6 March 1948,
UNTS 289, 3. The IMO policy has been that the adoption of an instrument is without prejudice to “the codification
and development of the law of the sea in UNCLOS or any present or future claims and legal views of any State
concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction”, IMO Secretariat,
Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization:
Study by the Secretariat of the IMO, IMO Doc. LEG/MISC.7 (19 January 2012), 7.
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instruments is highly desirable and some studies have already made the first efforts in this
direction.133

Changes to rules and standards concerning ship construction and equipping will be
expected, in particular to take account of modifications to the usual designs for the bridge,
equipment on board, crew accommodations and passageways, and life-saving craft. What is
uncertain at this early stage is the extent of the change as we can reasonably expect different
levels of automation on MASS, and across several classes of ships (e.g. bulkers, container ships).
In this respect, the goal-based approach to maritime regulation will substantially facilitate the
accommodation of various technologies to produce desired safety, security, and environmental
outcomes.134

Particular MASS vessels can be expected to justify exemptions from certain rules. Some
conventions have provisions permitting exemptions issued by national maritime administrations,
and other States parties are expected to be notified of exemptions135 or equivalents.136 This
flexibility will be useful in transitioning MASS into a system designed for very different ships.
For example, compliance with particular certification requirements will be superfluous on ships
with the highest levels of automation (e.g. sewage certificates), and exemptions would be
appropriate. In other instances, rule compliance for MASS might need adaptation of the
regulatory requirement. A fully automated vessel will likely have an electronic log. Consistently
with the current trend, documentation requirements will be satisfied electronically and reporting
for various regulatory purposes will become increasingly passive.
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Classification Societies will play a key role in helping to develop appropriate standards
and unified requirements. IMO regulation frequently relies on the unified requirements adopted
by the International Association of Classification Societies. However, regulatory
accommodations will likely impact the mandatory audits under the III Code whose purpose is to
promote compliance with international instruments with no more favourable treatment. The
implications will extend to port State control inspections, which enforce international
instruments also with no more favourable treatment to ship or flag.

There will be implications for private law purposes which, while beyond the remit of this
article, should be mentioned, such as the evolving meaning of seaworthiness in the carriage of
goods by sea and insurance contracts, among others, since the ability of MASS vessels to depart
on and complete the maritime adventure in a timely and safe manner will also depend on shorebased systems.

VI.

Conclusion

The advent of MASS is a potential game-changer for international shipping and its regulation.
As the human factor is withdrawn from shipping in favour of artificial intelligence and
accompanying automated systems, international maritime law is not likely to function on a
business-as-usual scenario and will need to be adapted and further developed. However, it is
unlikely that the human factor will be fully removed from shipping as there will continue to be
trades and regions that will rely on manned ships. What can be envisioned is a future that will
have a versatile mix of manned and unmanned ships, often interacting when in close proximity
while navigating, varying by trading region, and with some trading regions having a higher
concentration of automated ship operations because of early regional buy-in.

MASS will potentially produce a range of direct and indirect impacts on the law of the
sea and maritime law, in particular during their early introduction when the two legal regimes
will need to adapt to the new technological environment. MASS will challenge a regulatory
system that has often lagged behind technology. The IMO has an opportunity to put an
anticipatory regulatory framework in place to influence the directions of the MASS technologies.
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Finally, in scoping the regulatory impacts and future agenda, the IMO should also
consider larger social questions. For example, as automated systems produce greater efficiencies
and cost-savings, are the technological risks fully internalised? Is substitution of artificial
intelligence for human judgement socially acceptable in all areas and aspects of shipping and
navigation, for example also with respect to passenger vessels? Are safety valves against
technological failure and hacking needed? How will MASS affect the distribution of risk in
shipping and with what consequences for responsibility and liability?
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